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Abstract The realm of digital media is undergoing fundamental changes as it moves
from mass media to an era of mass participation. This emergence of content created
by the masses requires to re-consider the conventional intellectual property rights
framework. Free content and protected content co-exist (in the Dark/Light Web).
We propose an alternative environment for the governance of digital content. It in-
corporates psychological aspects into its economics framework. Multi-agent systems
play an important role in order to create an infrastructure that makes the voluntary-
based environment sustainable.
We propose a platform based on an open contracts design that encourages vol-
untary payments. Peer-based reputation and recommendation mechanisms as well
as socio-emotive instruments facilitate norm adherence in this online environment.
They leverage the efficiency of alternative voluntary payment models based on fair-
ness concerns and reciprocity.
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The envisioned platform matches Dark Web content to consumers who value it
highly, provides Dark Web content creators with a basic reward for their work and
reduces the infringement of protected content in the Dark Web.
Keywords Music industry · Copyright · Digital media · Creative commons · Artist
life cycle · Light Web · Dark Web · Multi-agent systems
1 Introduction
Copyright law originated in the 18th century and the protection it provides is regarded
as an essential cornerstone for a successful intellectual property rights environment.
However, recently it has come under increasing scrutiny. Its original intention of pro-
moting the “progress of science and of useful arts” by granting a temporary monopoly
has been diluted significantly over the years. It has become an instrument of commer-
cial interests that now offers over 100 years of protection, even retroactively. More-
over, the attempts to adjust copyright law to the digital age—the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act in the USA and the EU Copyright Directive—essentially eliminated
any fair use rights granted by the original copyright law.
While the interests of consumers and the content industry have by and large been
fairly balanced by copyright law during the analogue era, the current legislation does
not seem to take established consumption patterns of the past and the potential bene-
fits of online distribution into account. Doubts remain whether copyright law is still
an adequate governance system for intellectual property rights in the digital age and
whether there are alternative ways to govern digital content, a more efficient eco-
system for ideas than the one copyright law offers?
As the balance of copyright law shifted towards industry interests, an alternative
rights scheme—the creative commons license—emerged that provides more flexi-
bility to content owners and addresses the recent negligence of consumer rights. Its
success1 underlines the emergence and importance of content created by the masses.
This development leads to a two-poled digital media environment in which the two
domains—free and protected content (or the Dark and the Light Web)—do not com-
pete, but co-exist and complement each other [12]. While content created by big
media (e.g. famous, established artists) is highly commercialised and embraces pro-
tection by conventional copyright law, content created by the masses (e.g. amateurs
and newcomer artists) prefers to be available under more flexible terms providing
better exposure.
Since the pool of free Dark Web content is vast and access to it is free, it remains
to be seen how content can be searched and found effectively and how its creators
can at least be rewarded on a basic level to make their efforts worthwhile. Unless
these two aspects are solved with satisfaction, the Dark Web either becomes a big
unorganised sprawl of data or it dries out because of a lack of incentives. Moreover,
infringement of copyrighted content must be kept in check in the Dark Web.
1The creative commons license is used by 130 million works and has been adapted to the legal systems of
52 countries as of December 2008.
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Hence, the paper’s aim is to analyse the emerging hybrid copyright world with free
and protected content environments co-existing. We describe how the potential of the
Dark Web—the free content environment—can be reached and what is necessary
to make the Dark Web i) search efficient, ii) financially sustainable and iii) norm
adhering.
Our approach is inter-disciplinary as socio-economic, technical as well as legal
aspects are taken into account. It builds on the concept of an open agent society for
digital content proposed by Pitt [10]. We suggest a platform for the provision of dig-
ital content that incorporates psychological aspects into its economics framework.
Multi-agent based reputation and recommendation systems play an important role in
order to create an infrastructure that makes voluntary payment-based models sustain-
able.
The contribution of behavioural economics is a more realistic analysis of economic
situations, one that takes the psychological underpinnings of economic behaviour bet-
ter into account. Social preferences explain this behaviour as they “assume people are
self-interested, but are also concerned about the payoffs of others” [3]. This depar-
ture from pure self-interest is based on the results of a vast number of laboratory
experiments conducted in recent years [2, 6]. Also, Regner and Barria [11] found a
significant level of voluntary payments in the real life environment of an online music
store which is particularly relevant to this paper’s context.
Multi-agent based systems can complement this as intelligent information agents
search, find and retrieve content with respect to users’ individual preferences and
provide the peer-based infrastructure to encourage pro-social behaviour and punish
free riding.
From a legal perspective, this relates to the literature about legal rules and stan-
dards [1]. Copyright law with all its exceptions (e.g. fair use) is essentially a case
of a legal standard as it grants substantial discretion to consumers. Digital rights
management (DRM) systems resemble legal rule making as they shift discretion to
producers. The intended exceptions of original copyright law cannot be taken into
account by rigid DRM designs. A softer, more flexible system would be preferable to
govern intellectual property rights in a socially efficient way.
Such a system also focuses on conflict prevention. It aims to solve legal disagree-
ments about rights infringement efficiently before they actually make it to the formal
system of lawyers and courts. This would mean substantial cost savings to society
since conflicts are avoided before the legal system comes into action.
Section 2 describes the changes in the digital media industry and its emerging two-
poled structure. It also explains the peculiarities of content created by the masses for
the masses and its implications. Section 3 presents the theoretical background, Sect. 4
describes the envisaged platform and Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Industry snapshot
Two domains co-exist in the hybrid copyright world that is emerging. DRM-protected
content is available in the Light Web, while the Dark Web contains free content cre-
ated by the masses.
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The Light Web is essentially the conventional offline retail model moved online.
Established artists (and their label) benefit from the high level of content protection
provided by the Light Web environment. This guarantees constant revenue streams as
long as the artist remains popular. The Light Web also means exposure of the content
is restricted (through distribution limits and higher prices than free content) which is
ideally offset by the established reputation and sizeable fan base of famous artists.
However, protected content’s limitations on the potential exposure would be a
concern for newcomer artists. Instead, they appreciate the informational role of free
content distribution, since it is their only way to find a bigger audience without the
conventional label promotion. It is also the domain for amateur content that is in-
creasingly put online without any (immediate) commercial motivations.
The two domains, Light Web and Dark Web, do not compete against each other
for domination of the digital content market. Instead, both provide unique advantages
for certain types of artists and are therefore inhabited by different types of artists.2
While exposure appears to be essential for newcomers to start off, guaranteed rev-
enues and therefore stronger content protection will likely affect the decision of es-
tablished artists. Voluntary-based models will appeal to newcomers (and amateurs)
in the Dark Web. DRM-based models are the likely choice of established artists in
the Light Web. There is a flow or interaction between the two environments when
newcomer artists of the Dark Web are discovered by the masses and eventually turn
to a more commercial Light Web approach with a higher degree of protection and the
guaranteed revenues that protected content provides. Complements-based3 or even
voluntary-based models can be the choice of famous artists, if they decide to return
to the Dark Web.
At the core of both domains lies the question of how the content distribution and
search will be organised. In particular, the Dark Web requires an intelligent search
infrastructure so that its free content will be found and consumed by customers who
appreciate it most.
While business actors known from the traditional media industry (artists, labels)
still play a role in this changing environment, it is innovative service providers that
take on more prominent roles. Dark Web intermediaries (P2P search platforms and
social web based networks like MySpace, Yahoo! Music or facebook) but also online
platforms like iTunes add value by assisting consumers to find the music they really
enjoy. Personalised music recommendations are presented to users (two strands of
music recommendation services can be distinguished: collaborative filtering [13] and
acoustics-based approaches).
3 Theoretical background
Without a doubt economic motivation by self-interest accurately explains behaviour
in many situations. Predictions are particularly fine the more competitive markets
2See [12] for a more detailed description.
3Business models where content is distributed without restrictions, and revenue is generated from comple-
mentary products and services like concerts, merchandising and licenses.
Governance of digital content in the era of mass participation 103
are. However, many economic transactions are not taking place in a competitive,
impersonal market environment and the more social and personal the exchange is,
the more other-regarding behaviour matters [14].
Assuming social preferences signifies a more realistic analysis of economic situ-
ations, one that takes the psychological underpinnings of economic behaviour better
into account. Other-regarding behaviour complements self-interest in a theory of so-
cial utility [2]. While individuals with social preferences are driven by self-interest,
they also take the well-being and/or the intentions of other individuals into account.
This can include fairness considerations, reciprocity and concerns for social welfare
(instead of private profit), but also the impact of emotional aspects (guilt, shame,
pride) on decisions can elicit social preferences.
Numerous laboratory experiments successfully tested for other-regarding behav-
iour and reciprocity is particularly helpful in explaining the results.4 Drawing from
this, a contract design with mutual opportunities to reciprocate appears to be a useful
construct, in particular when effort—or payment in the context of digital media—
cannot be enforced.
The basic design can be extended so that users can punish free riders (users who
frequently failed to contribute/pay). The effect of the mere existence of a way to pun-
ish un-cooperative users has been found to be beneficial as cooperation increases [4].
Such a punishment option can sustain high cooperation rates, but it also causes
negative welfare effects when this option is abused by anger-dominated subjects [7].
Rounds of retaliation may result. Instead, Vasalou et al. [15] find that trying to reduce
negative feelings and facilitating reparation (apology and forgiveness) causes subjects
to cooperate (more), without the negative side effects known from the punishment
option.
The sequencing of instruments therefore appears to be important. While a pun-
ishment option might be necessary for stability, and to keep users honest, it should
follow an emotive instrument that appeals to subjects to correct their behaviour them-
selves.
Multi-agent based systems are applied to digital content and the information soci-
ety in Pitt [10] by forming an open agent society. The key idea here is that if intelli-
gence is encapsulated in an agent, then the agents should be organised as a society,
and then the rules of the society can be used to ensure responsible behaviour. It is dis-
cussed how an agent society can be used to regulate behaviour in future information
trading scenarios and stressed that it is essential that we support information trading
agents with decentralised mechanisms for enforcing honest and reliable behaviour.
Neville and Pitt [9] propose a computational socio-cognitive and economic frame-
work (CSCEF) as such a mechanism for distributed regulation. This inter-disciplinary
framework formalises social theories of trust, reputation, recommendation and learn-
ing from direct experience and integrates these socio-cognitive formalisms with the
agents’ economic reasoning. This produces an agent whose behaviour in commer-
cial transactions is influenced by its social interactions, whilst being motivated and
constrained by its economic considerations.
4For instance, Fehr et al. [5] found increased effort levels when mutual opportunities to reciprocate have
been provided in experimental settings in a labour context (first a firm sets a wage, then a worker decides
on the effort level, while finally the firm may pay a bonus).
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In the legal context, an approach towards intellectual property rights as a legal
standard instead of a legal rule is preferable. Under the flexible governance of a legal
standard reasonable exceptions can be granted and trivial violations are not point-
lessly prosecuted. In contrast, a legal rule is strictly set up ex ante and leaves no
leeway for interpretation. The realm of copyright is a field where a standard should
be preferred [1]. This was recognised by copyright law in its original form as it allows
a number of exceptions (e.g. fair use) that can be handled under ex post discretion.
DRM systems based on written copyright law form a legal rule instead. They pre-
vent any actions that are technically an infringement and thus fail to allow for the
exceptions incorporated into copyright law and the “wiggle room” at the discretion
of society.
In that sense, such a governance system would focus on conflict prevention which
can be understood as the attempt to solve legal disagreements between parties before
they become real disputes in front of the court and require dispute resolution or even
litigation. Such a focus to solve cases before they actually make it to the formal legal
system would mean substantial cost savings to society since the full legal apparatus
does not even get started.
4 The platform
As explained before an open contracts design provides mutual opportunities to recip-
rocate and can encourage users to make voluntary payments. When content owners
decide to make their content freely available through the Dark Web, they benefit from
increased exposure and they may also expect a basic return of voluntary payments for
their work that can cover their opportunity costs or may even exceed them. However,
an open contracts design on its own is unlikely to be successful, because content may
not be found in the vast Dark Web and voluntary payments may not reach a sufficient
or stable level. Also abuse of copyrighted material may occur in the Dark Web. Fur-
ther instruments are necessary to make the platform i) search efficient, ii) financially
sustainable and iii) norm adhering.
In our suggested platform a multi-agent based infrastructure complements the
open contracts design. It acts as the users’ portal to the online content community
as it facilitates the finding of interesting new content, the fair remuneration of con-
sumed content and the norm adherence within the community.
While content is obtained directly from the creator (or the service provider) in
the Light Web, it is shared amongst peers in the Dark Web. Recommendations about
content are exchanged among peers to facilitate the matching of preferences. More-
over, recommendations about peer behaviour are shared among peers and content
creators to build up trust ratings of peers. This information can be used to reciprocate
positively against fair and negatively against unfair peers.
4.1 Search
The search efficiency for new good music is increased through automatically gen-
erated content recommendations within the community. As peers share their music
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preferences the taste matching of music amongst peers is improved. In contrast to
conventional collaborative filtering which is based on purchase decisions, the content
search can analyse the preference profiles of peers at a deeper level. Consumption
data can be used instead of purchase data. The Shared Preferences Model5 (SPM)
could use the ratings given to songs. However, it may be too cumbersome for many
users to tag songs with their ratings and update them. Instead, using the play count
of songs (and related data as frequency and time of the day, etc.) promises to supply
better data and a superior image of peers’ music taste. Sharing the preferences with
the P2P network should result in valuable recommendations of appreciated music,
provided by a “personal DJ”.
4.2 Payment
Similar to when the agent handles making content recommendations there may be a
number of different metrics for estimating a suitable voluntary payment for the peer
to make. These variables could include the:
• Number of times the content has been played
• Peer’s explicit rating
• Content’s relative position against this month’s other new music
• Content owner’s requested terms (expected payment)
• Content’s genre/media category
• Peer’s budget
Some of these variables can be specified by the peer. For instance, a certain (monthly)
budget can be set that should be spent on content. Peers may also have different set-
tings for voluntary payments depending on the genre. They may not wish to con-
tribute to pop music, but feel more generously towards folk music, for instance.
Content owners may suggest an expected payment for their content. It may be
that the consumer doesn’t view/download content of this type or simply ignores the
suggestion (see consequences of norm violation in the next subsection). The agent
could ignore suggestions that are outside of what is considered acceptable terms by
either the online community as a whole or its own peer. Content owners can also set
a very low expected payment to maximise their exposure. This would be the case of
the Dark Web and its participatory media where the content owner may primarily be
a consumer himself.
The agent will formulate suggested voluntary payments for each digital item on
behalf of the user. At specified dates (e.g. monthly) or after a certain number of pay-
ments are ready to be made the agent will prepare a list of suggested payments to
the peer for approval. Before any payments are authorised, the peer would be given
the opportunity to view and if necessary alter the payments from those suggested by
its agent. This preview screen would also allow the peer to query why the agent sug-
gests any given payment. The peer can either accept or adjust their agents’ suggested
payments. Adjustments of the suggested payments will get fed back to customise the
5For further description see [16].
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voluntary payment estimation algorithm in order for the agent to make more suit-
able suggestions in the future. If there are any payments authorised, then the agent
performs the necessary micro-payments and stores the peer’s receipts and newly ac-
quired rights.
4.3 Norm violation and adherence
In determining whether a peer has violated a norm of the community, the sharing
peer’s agent is looking for a discrepancy between the peer agent’s actions and the
peer agent’s statements. Such a discrepancy occurs for instance, if the peer states
he enjoyed the content or if the peer is sharing the content without having made a
payment. However, the peer may attempt to cover up the norm violation by either
failing to rate the content or by making an incorrect negative recommendation. While
this strategy protects the peer’s trust rating ((s)he avoids being labelled as a free rider,
which would cause negative reciprocity), it misinforms the shared preference model
(biased recommendations would be made due to the wrong preferences provided).
Therefore, agents who lie to avoid paying for content lose the added value of a well
functioning recommendation system. A peer will never meet friends (other peers with
similar tastes), if (s)he pretends to dislike everything. He or she will only be ranked
highly with those peers who also claim not to like anything. However, they won’t be
able to share content because they cannot communicate any likes or dislikes in order
to do so.
Explicit use cases can be defined for norm violation, norm adherence and the
update of trust ratings:
Following the sharing of content with a peer, the peer agent made:
No recommendation and no payment
In this case the sharing agent assumes after a period of time that the content was not
of interest to its peer and automatically updates its Shared Preference Model (SPM)
accordingly. In the future the peer will be offered less content of this type.
No recommendation and a payment
Upon receiving the notification of payment the sharing peer assumes the content was
of interest to its peer and automatically updates its SPM accordingly. In the future
the peer will be offered more content of this type from the sharing agent (but not the
community as a whole as this would require a recommendation). The trust rating of
this peer is improved so it could receive preferential treatment in the future.
Negative recommendation and no payment
The sharing peer updates its SPM so that the peer is offered less content of this type
in the future.
Negative recommendation and a payment
The sharing peer updates its SPM so that the peer is offered less content of this type
in the future. The trust rating of this peer is improved so it could receive preferential
treatment in the future.
Positive recommendation and no payment
The peer has been identified as a free rider; this is an example of open norm violation.
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The sharing peer will update its trust rating of the peer to ensure that a retaliatory
sanction is taken against the peer. For instance, in the future the agent will not be
offered the certain content even though it is being shared with other peers.
Positive recommendation and a payment
The peer will update its SPM so in the future the peer will get more content of this
type. The trust rating of this peer is improved so it could receive preferential treatment
in the future.
Shared the content but made no payment
The peer has been identified as a free rider; this is an example of open norm violation.
The sharing peer will update its trust rating of the peer to ensure that a retaliatory
sanction is taken against the peer. For instance, in the future the agent will not be
offered certain content even though it is being shared with other peers.
Potentially, the performance of this open norm-based community platform is
threatened by malicious or naive agents. These undesirable agents may spread viral
infections, masquerade as content producers but sell non-working files, execute denial
of service attacks by constantly making random dataset comparison requests or un-
fairly rate other peers via the recommendation system. However, it is shown6 that by
enabling agents to model their trust in a peer and make recommendations (which will
lead to the formation of reputation beliefs) agents can isolate such harmful agents
from the community, thus protecting themselves and the system performance as a
whole.
As mutual opportunities to reciprocate increase the efficiency of an open contracts
design, additional options to reciprocate negatively (punishment of free riders) or
positively (rewarding frequent supporters) should increase the cooperation rate, e.g.
the voluntary payments made. Hence, the platform’s functionality should be extended
for norm-adhering peers, while it should be restricted for norm-violators.
Once content is used in an inappropriate way agents interact with peers. Peers
who regularly consume content without paying for it accordingly7 can be identified
and punished by their peers. Their download speed can be reduced as well as the
actual access to content. Harsh free riders may even be temporarily banned from the
community. On the other hand, bonus or reward schemes can be implemented for
consumers who frequently make voluntary payments or consumers who successfully
recommend the creator. These benefits could be (backstage) concert tickets, limited
edition T-shirts, autographs or related merchandise.
Moreover, emotional aspects like shame and embarrassment can be considered
to make peers more aware of their ‘negative’ actions. In addition, forgiveness al-
gorithms8 that take respective circumstances (past behaviour patterns, for instance)
into account give free riders a chance to re-consider their uncooperative action, be-
fore steps to punish the user may be taken. Combined with P2P-based reputation and
recommendation systems a sustainable environment can be created where abuse of
6See the P2P trust and reputation framework developed in [9].
7Voluntary payment pleas may have been frequently disregarded or copyrighted material may have been
downloaded and frequently consumed.
8See [15].
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free content is gently pointed out to the user and infringement of copyrighted mater-
ial is limited. These instruments will leverage the efficiency of alternative voluntary
payment models based on fairness concerns and reciprocity. Positive incentives are
created to make peers conform to the rules of the system as pro-social behaviour is
encouraged.
Monitoring systems based on statistics, variation or historic patterns of interaction
can also help to track down potential disputes about copyrighted material and assist
to negotiate a way back to where both sides benefit. Conflict prevention can thus be
decentralised when peers of the community act themselves against unsocial behaviour
by other peers.
5 Conclusions
The emergence of participatory media9—which contrasts the incumbent mass media
approach—stresses the importance of an open and consumer-oriented solution to the
way digital content is governed.
A flexible platform—suitable for free and protected content—becomes increas-
ingly important in the realm of digital media where a hybrid copyright world is about
to develop. The emergence of content created by the masses and subsequently two
co-existing and complementary environments for digital content require that content
activities along the value chain also need to cater for “free” content created by the
masses besides conventional protected content. The development of efficient tools
and instruments in the content finding phase (reputation and recommendation sys-
tems, collaborative filtering) as well as voluntary-based business models should be of
benefit.
The Dark Web platform we propose is based on an open contracts design that
encourages voluntary payments. Peer-based reputation and recommendation mecha-
nisms as well as socio-emotive instruments facilitate norm adherence and pro-social
behaviour in this online environment. They will leverage the efficiency of alterna-
tive voluntary payment models based on fairness concerns and reciprocity. The envi-
sioned platform aims to match Dark Web content to consumers who value it highly,
provide Dark Web content creators with a basic reward for their work and reduce the
infringement of protected content in the Dark Web.
Such an environment helps to reap the potential benefits of an information soci-
ety. The approach does not tackle the challenges faced by the digital media industry
merely by battling technological progress and locking away content as is the case with
most DRM systems and “trusted computing”. Instead, a socially efficient solution is
the goal. The proposed platform can be seen as a better way to align corporate and
consumer interests in digital media. Its components describe what current systems
may need to adopt to reach this goal.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
9See Kluth [8] for more about the coming era of mass participation.
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